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Abstract—Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are stealthy,
sophisticated, and long-term attacks that threaten the security
and privacy of sensitive information. Interactions of APTs with
victim system introduce information flows that are recorded in
the system logs. Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT)
is a promising detection mechanism for detecting APTs. DIFT
taints information flows originating at system entities that are
susceptible to an attack, tracks the propagation of the tainted
flows, and authenticates the tainted flows at certain system com-
ponents according to a pre-defined security policy. Deployment
of DIFT to defend against APTs in cyber systems is limited
by the heavy resource and performance overhead associated
with DIFT. Effectiveness of detection by DIFT depends on the
false-positives and false-negatives generated due to inadequacy of
DIFT’s pre-defined security policies to detect stealthy behavior
of APTs. In this paper, we propose a resource efficient model for
DIFT by incorporating the security costs, false-positives, and
false-negatives associated with DIFT. Specifically, we develop
a game-theoretic framework and provide an analytical model
of DIFT that enables the study of trade-off between resource
efficiency and the effectiveness of detection. Our game model is
a nonzero-sum, infinite-horizon, average reward stochastic game.
Our model incorporates the information asymmetry between
players that arises from DIFT’s inability to distinguish malicious
flows from benign flows and APT’s inability to know the locations
where DIFT performs a security analysis. Additionally, the game
has incomplete information as the transition probabilities (false-
positive and false-negative rates) are unknown. We propose a
multiple-time scale stochastic approximation algorithm to learn
an equilibrium solution of the game. We prove that our algorithm
converges to an average reward Nash equilibrium. We evaluate
our proposed model and algorithm on a real-world ransomware
dataset and validate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
Index Terms—Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs), Dynamic
Information Flow Tracking (DIFT), Stochastic games, Average
reward Nash equilibrium, Multi-agent reinforcement learning
I. INTRODUCTION
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are emerging class of
cyber threats that victimize governments and organizations
around the world through cyber espionage and sensitive infor-
mation hijacking [1], [2]. Unlike ordinary cyber threats (e.g.,
malware, trojans) that execute quick damaging attacks, APTs
employ sophisticated and stealthy attack strategies that enable
unauthorized operation in the victim system over a prolonged
period of time [3]. End goal of an APT typically aims to
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sabotage critical infrastructures (e.g., Stuxnet [4]) or exfiltrate
sensitive information (e.g., Operation Aurora, Duqu, Flame,
and Red October [5]). APTs follow a multi-stage stealthy
attack approach to achieve the goal of the attack. Each stage
of an APT is customized to exploit set of vulnerabilities in
the victim to achieve a set of sub-goals (e.g., stealing user
credentials, network reconnaissance) that will eventually lead
to the end goal of the attack [6]. The stealthy, sophisticated and
strategic nature of APTs make detecting and mitigating them
challenging using conventional security mechanisms such as
firewalls, anti-virus softwares, and intrusion detection systems
that heavily rely on the signatures of malware or anomalies
observed in the benign behavior of the system.
Although APTs operate in stealthy manner without inducing
any suspicious abrupt changes in the victim system, the
interactions of APTs with the system introduce information
flows in the victim system. Information flows consist of
data and control commands that dictate how data is propa-
gated between different system entities (e.g., instances of a
computer program, files, network sockets) [7], [8]. Dynamic
Information Flow Tracking (DIFT) is a mechanism developed
to dynamically track the usage of information flows during
program executions [7], [9]. Operation of DIFT is based
on three core steps. i) Taint (tag) all the information flows
that originate from the set of system entities susceptible to
cyber threats (e.g., network sockets, computer programs) [7],
[9]. ii) Propagate the tags into the output information flows
based on a set of predefined tag propagation rules which
track the mixing of tagged flows with untagged flows at the
different system entities. iii) Verify the authenticity of the
tagged flows by performing a security analysis at a subset
of system entities using a set of pre-specified tag check rules.
When a tagged (suspicious) information flow is verified as
malicious through a security check, DIFT makes use of the
tags of the malicious information flow to identify victimized
system entities of the attack and reset or delete them to protect
the system and mitigate the threats. Since information flows
capture the footprint of APTs in the victim system and DIFT
allows tracking and inspection of information flows, DIFT has
been recently employed as a promising defense mechanism
against APTs [10], [11].
Tagging and tracking information flows in a system using
DIFT adds additional resource costs to the underlying system
in terms of memory and storage. In addition, inspecting
information flows demands extra processing power from the
system. Since, APTs maintain the characteristics of their
malicious information flows (e.g., data rate, spatio-temporal
patterns of the control commands) close to the characteristics
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of benign information flows [12] to avoid detection, pre-
defined security check rules of DIFT can miss the detection
of APTs (false-negatives) or raise false alarms by identifying
benign flows as malicious flows (false-positives). Typically,
the number of benign information flows exceeds the number
of malicious information flows in a system by a large factor.
As a consequence, DIFT incurs a tremendous resource and
performance overhead to the underlying system due to fre-
quent security checks and false-positives. The high cost and
performance degradation of DIFT can be worse in large scale
systems such as servers used in the data centers [11].
There has been software-based design approaches to reduce
the resource and performance cost of DIFT [9], [13]. How-
ever, widespread deployment of DIFT across various cyber
systems and platforms is heavily constrained by the added
resource and performance costs that are inherent to DIFT’s
implementation and due to false-positives and false-negatives
generated by DIFT [14], [15]. An analytical model of DIFT
need to capture the system level interactions between DIFT
and APTs, and cost of resources and performance overhead
due to security checks. Additionally, false-positives and false-
negatives generated by DIFT is also need to be considered
while deploying DIFT to detect APTs.
In this paper we consider a computer system equipped with
DIFT that is susceptible to an attack by APT and provide
a game-theoretic model that enables the study of trade-off
between resource efficiency and effectiveness of detection
of DIFT. Strategic interactions of an APT to achieve the
malicious objective while evading detection depends on the
effectiveness of the DIFT’s defense policy. On the other
hand, determining a resource-efficient policy for DIFT that
maximize the detection probability depends on the nature of
APT’s interactions with the system. Non-cooperative game
theory provides a rich set of rules that can model the strategic
interactions between two competing agents (DIFT and APT).
The feasible interactions among system processes and objects
(e.g., files, network sockets) can be abstracted into a graph
called information flow graph [13]. The contributions of this
paper are the following.
• We model the long-term, stealthy, strategic interactions
between DIFT and APT as a two-player, nonzero-sum,
average reward, infinite-horizon stochastic game. The
proposed game model captures the resource costs asso-
ciated with DIFT in performing security analysis as well
as the false-positives and false-negatives of DIFT.
• We provide, MA-ARNE (Multi-Agent Average Reward
Nash Equilibrium), a multi-agent reinforcement learning-
based algorithm that learns an equilibrium solution of the
game between DIFT and APT. MA-ARNE is a multiple-
time scale stochastic approximation algorithm.
• We prove the convergence of MA-ARNE algorithm to an
average reward Nash equilibrium of the game.
• We evaluate the performance of our approach via an
experimental analysis on ransomware attack data ob-
tained from Refinable Attack INvestigation (RAIN) [13]
framework.
A. Related Work
Stochastic games introduced by Shapley generalize the
Markov decision processes to model the strategic interactions
between two or more players that occur in a sequence of
stages [16]. Dynamic nature of stochastic games enables
the modeling of competitive market scenarios in economics
[17], competition within and between species for resources in
evolutionary biology [18], resilience of cyber-physical systems
in engineering [19], and secure networks under adversarial
interventions in the field of computer/network science [20].
Study of stochastic games is often focused on finding a
set of Nash Equilibrium (NE) [21] policies for the players
such that no player is able to increase their respective payoffs
by unilaterally deviating from their NE policies. The payoffs
of a stochastic game are usually evaluated under discounted
or limiting average payoff criteria [22], [23]. Discounted
payoff criteria, where future rewards of the players are scaled
down by a factor between zero and one, is widely used in
analyzing stochastic games as an NE is guaranteed to exist
for any discounted stochastic game [24]. Limiting average
payoff criteria considers the time-average of the rewards
received by the players during the game [23]. The existence
of an NE under limiting average payoff criteria for a general
stochastic game is an open problem. When an NE exists, value
iteration, policy iteration, and linear/nonlinear programming
based approaches are proposed in the literature to find an NE
[22], [25]. These approaches, however, require the knowledge
of transition structure and the reward structure of the game.
Also, these solution approaches are only guaranteed to find an
exact NE only in a special classes of stochastic games, such
as zero-sum stochastic games, where rewards of the players
sum up to zero in all the game states [22].
Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithms are
proposed in the literature to obtain NE policies of stochastic
games when the transition probabilities of the game and
reward structure of the players are unknown. In [26] authors
introduced two properties, rationality and convergence, that
are necessary for a learning agent to learn a discounted NE
in MARL setting and proposed a WOLF-policy hill climbing
algorithm which is empirically shown to converge to an NE.
Q-learning based algorithms are proposed to compute an
NE in discounted stochastic games [27] and average reward
stochastic games [28]. Although the convergence of these
approaches are guaranteed in the case of zero-sum games,
convergence in nonzero-sum games require more restrctive
assumptions on the game, such as existence of an unique NE
[27]. Recently, a two-time scale algorithm to compute an NE
of a nonzero-sum discounted stochastic game was proposed
in [29] where authors showed the convergence of algorithm
to an exact NE of the game.
Stochastic games have been used to analyze security of
computer networks in the presence of malicious attackers
[30], [31]. Game-theoretic frameworks was proposed in the
literature to model interaction of APTs with the system
[32], [33]. While [32] modeled a deceptive APT, a mimicry
attack by APT was considered in [33]. Our prior works used
game theory to model the interaction of APTs and a DIFT-
based detection system [34]-[35]. The game models in [34],
[36], [37] are non-stochastic as the notions of false alarms
and false-negatives are not considered. Recently, a stochastic
model of DIFT-games was proposed in [38], [39] when the
transition probabilities of the game are known. However,
the transition probabilities, which are the rates of generation
of false alarms and false negatives at the different system
components, are often unknown. In [40], the case of unknown
transition probabilities was analyzed and empirical results
to compute approximate equilibrium policies was presented.
In the conference version of this paper [35] we considered
discounted a DIFT-game with unknown transition probabilities
and proposed a two-time scale reinforcement algorithm that
converges to NE of the discounted game.
B. Organization of the Paper
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II presents the formal definitions and existing results
from game theory and stochastic approximation algorithms
that are being used to derive the results present in this paper.
Section III formulates the stochastic game between DIFT
and APT. Section IV analyzes the necessary and sufficient
conditions required to characterize the equilibrium of DIFT-
APT game. Section V presents a reinforcement learning based
algorithm to compute an equilibrium of DIFT-APT game.
Section VI provides an experimental study of the proposed
equilibrium seeking algorithm on a real-world attack dataset.
Section VII presents conclusions.
II. FORMAL DEFINITIONS AND EXISTING RESULTS
A. Stochastic Games
A stochastic game Γ is defined as a tuple < K,S,A,P,r >,
where K denotes the number of players, S represents the
state space, A := A1 × . . . ,×AK denotes the action space,
P designates the transition probability kernel, and r represents
the reward functions. Here S and A are finite spaces. Let
Ak :=∪s∈SAk(s) be the action space of the game correspond-
ing to each player k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, where Ak(s) denotes the set
of actions allowed for player k at state s∈ S. Let pi k be the set
of stationary policies corresponding to player k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}
in Γ. Then a policy pik ∈ pi k is said to be a deterministic
stationary policy if pik ∈ {0,1}|Ak| and said to be a stochastic
stationary policy if pik ∈ [0,1]|Ak|. Let P(s′|s,a1, . . . ,aK) be
the probability of transitioning from state s ∈ S to a state
s′ ∈ S under set of actions (a1, . . . ,aK), where ak ∈ Ak(s)
denotes the action chosen by player k at the state s. Further
let rk(s,a1, . . . ,aK ,s′) be the reward received by the player k
when state of the game transitions from states s to s′ under
set of actions (a1, . . . ,aK) of the players at state s.
B. Average Reward Payoff Structure
Let pi = (pi1, . . . ,piK). Then define ρk(s,pi) be the average
reward payoff of player k when the game starts at an arbitrary
state s ∈ S and the players follow their respective policies pi .
Let st and atk be the state of game at time t and the action of
player k at time t, respectively. Then ρk(s,pi) is defined as
ρk(s,pi) = liminf
T→∞
1
T +1
T
∑
t=0
Es,pi [rk(st ,at1, . . . ,atK)], (1)
where the term Es,pi [rk(st ,at1, . . . ,atK)] denotes the expected
reward at time t when the game starts from a state s and
the players draw a set of actions (at1, . . . ,a
t
K) at current state
st based on their respective policies from pi . All the players in
Γ aim to maximize their individual payoff values in Eqn. (1).
Let −k be the opponents of a player k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} (i.e.,
−k := {1, . . . ,K}\k). Then let pi−k := {pi1, . . . ,piK}\pik denotes
a set of stationary policies of the opponents of player k.
Equilibrium of Γ under average reward criteria is given below.
Definition II.1 (ARNE). A set of stationary policies pi∗ =
(pi∗1 , . . . ,pi
∗
K) forms an Average Reward Nash Equilibrium
(ARNE) of Γ if and only if
ρk(s,pi∗k ,pi
∗
−k)≥ ρk(s,pik,pi∗−k),
for all s ∈ S,pik ∈ pi k and k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
A policy pi∗= (pi∗1 , . . . ,pi
∗
K) is referred to as an ARNE policy
of Γ. When all the players follow ARNE policy, no player k
is able to increase its payoff value by unilaterally deviating
from its respective ARNE policy pi∗k .
C. Unichain Stochastic Games
Define P(pi) to be the transition probability structure of
Γ induced by a set of deterministic player policies pi . Note
that P(pi) is a Markov chain formed in the state space S.
Assumption II.2 presents a condition on P(pi).
Assumption II.2. Induced Markov chain P(pi) corresponding
to every deterministic stationary policy set pi contains exactly
one recurrent class of states.
Assumption II.2 imposes a structural constraint on the
Markov chain induced by deterministic stationary policy set.
Here, the single recurrent class need not necessarily contain
all s ∈ S. There may exist some transient states in P(pi). Also
note that any Γ that satisfies Assumption II.2 can have multiple
recurrent classes in P(pi) under some stochastic stationary
policy set pi . Stochastic games that satisfy Assumption II.2
are referred to as unichain stochastic games. In a special case
where the recurrent class contains all the states in the state
space, Γ is referred as an irreducible stochastic game [22].
Let Rl and T denote a set of states in the lth recurrent
class of the induced Markov chain P(pi) for l ∈ {1, . . . ,L},
and a set of transient states in P(pi), respectively, where L
denote the number of recurrent classes. Further let ρk(s) be
the average reward payoff of player k when the initial state
is s ∈ S. The following proposition gives useful results on the
average reward values of the states in each Rl and T.
Proposition II.3 ([22], Section 3.2). The following statements
are true for any induced Markov chain P(pi) of Γ.
1) For l ∈ {1, . . . ,L} and for all s ∈ Rl , ρk(s) = ρ lk, where
each ρ lk denotes a real-valued constant.
2) ρk(s) =
L
∑
l=1
ql(s)ρ lk, if s∈T, where ql(s) is the probability
of reaching a state in lth recurrent class starting from s.
The first statement in Proposition II.3 implies that the aver-
age reward payoff of player k takes the same value ρ lk for each
state in the lth recurrent class. The second statement suggests
that the average reward payoff of a transient state is a convex
combination of the average payoff values corresponding to
L recurrent classes ρ1k , . . . ,ρ
L
k . Proposition II.3 shows that for
any stochastic game, the average reward payoffs corresponding
to each state solely depends on the average reward payoffs of
the recurrent classes in P(pi).
D. ARNE in Unichain Stochastic Games
Existence of an ARNE for nonzero-sum stochastic games
is open. However, the existence of ARNE is shown for some
special classes of stochastic games [22].
Proposition II.4 ([23], Theorem 2). Consider a stochastic
game that satisfies Assumption II.2. Then there exists an ARNE
for the stochastic game.
Let pik ∈ pi k be expressed as pik = [pik(s)]s∈S, where pik(s) =
[pik(s,ak)]ak∈Ak(s). Further let a¯ := (a1, . . . ,aK) and a−k :=
a¯\ak. Define P(s′|s,ak,pi−k) = ∑
a−k∈A−k(s)
P(s′|s, a¯)pi−k(s,a−k),
where P(s′|s, a¯) is the probability of transitioning to a state
s′ from state s under action set a¯. Also let rk(s,ak,pi−k) =
∑
a−k∈A−k(s)
P(s′|s, a¯)rk(s, a¯,s′)pi−k(s,a−k), where rk(s, a¯,s′) is
the reward for player k under action set a¯ when a state tran-
sitions from s to s′. Then a necessary and sufficient condition
for characterizing an ARNE of a stochastic game that satisfies
Assumption II.2 is given in the following proposition.
Proposition II.5 ([23], Theorem 4). Under Assumption II.2,
a set of stochastic stationary policies (pi1, . . . ,piK) forms an
ARNE in Γ if and only if (pi1, . . . ,piK) satisfies,
ρk(s)+ vk(s) = rk(s,ak,pi−k)+∑
s′∈S
P(s′|s,ak,pi−k)vk(s′)+λ s,akk
for all s ∈ S, ak ∈Ak(s), k ∈ {1, . . .K}, (2a)
ρk(s)−µs,akk = ∑
s′∈S
P(s′|s,ak,pi−k)ρk(s′)
for all s ∈ S, ak ∈Ak(s), k ∈ {1, . . .K}, (2b)
∑
k∈{1,...,K}
∑
s∈S
∑
ak∈Ak(s)
(λ s,akk +µ
s,ak
k )pik(s,ak) = 0. (2c)
λ s,akk ≥ 0, µs,akk ≥ 0, pik(s,ak)≥ 0
for all s ∈ S, ak ∈Ak(s), k ∈ {1, . . .K}, (2d)
∑
ak∈Ak(s)
pik(s,ak) = 1 for all s ∈ S, k ∈ {1, . . .K}, (2e)
where vk(s) is called as the “value” of the game for player k
at a state s ∈ S.
E. Stochastic Approximation Algorithms
Let h : Rmz → Rmz be a continuous function of a set of
parameters z ∈ Rmz . Then Stochastic Approximation (SA)
algorithms solve a set of equations of the form h(z) = 0 based
on the noisy measurements of h(z). The classical SA algorithm
takes the following form.
zn+1 = zn+δ nz [h(z
n)+wnz ], for n≥ 0 (3)
Here, n denotes the iteration index and zn denote the
estimation of z at nth iteration of the algorithm. The terms
wnz and δ nz represent the zero mean measurement noise asso-
ciated with zn and the step-size of the algorithm, respectively.
Note that the stationary points of Eqn. (3) coincide with
the solutions of h(z) = 0 when the noise term wnz is zero.
Convergence analysis of SA algorithms requires investigating
their associated Ordinary Differential Equations (ODEs). The
ODE form of the SA algorithm in Eqn. (3) is given in Eqn. (4).
z˙ = h(z) (4)
Additionally, the following assumptions on δ nz are required
to guarantee the convergence of an SA algorithm.
Assumption II.6. The step-size δ nz satisfies,
∞
∑
n=0
δ nz = ∞ and
∞
∑
n=0
(δ nz )2 = 0.
Few examples of δ nz that satisfy the conditions given in
Assumption II.6 are δ nz = 1/n and δ nz = 1/n log(n). A con-
vergence result that holds for a more general class of SA
algorithms is given below.
Proposition II.7. Consider an SA algorithm in the following
form defined over a set of parameters z ∈Rmz and a contin-
uous function h :Rmz →Rmz .
zn+1 =Θ(zn+δ nz [h(z
n)+wnz +κ
n]), for n≥ 0, (5)
where Θ is a projection operator that projects each zn iterates
onto a compact and convex set Λ ∈ Rmz and κn denotes a
bounded random sequence. Let the ODE associated with the
iterate in Eqn. (5) is given by,
z˙ = Θ¯(h(z)), (6)
where Θ¯(h(z)) = lim
η→0
Θ(z+ηh(z))−z
η and Θ¯ denotes a projection
operator that restricts the evolution of ODE in Eqn. (6) to
the set Λ. Let the nonempty compact set Z denotes a set
of asymptotically stable equilibrium points of the ODE in
Eqn. (6).
Then zn converges almost surely to a point in Z as n→ ∞
given the following conditions are satisfied,
1) δ nz satisfies the conditions in Assumption II.6.
2) lim
n→∞
(
sup
n¯>n
∣∣∣∣ n¯∑
l=n
δ nz wnz
∣∣∣∣)= 0 almost surely.
3) lim
n→∞κ
n = 0 almost surely.
Consider a class of SA algorithms that consist of two
interdependent iterates that update on two different time scales
(i.e., step-sizes of two iterates are different in the order of
magnitude). Let x ∈ Rmx and y ∈ Rmy and n ≥ 0. Then the
iterates given in the following equations portray a format of
such two-time scale SA algorithm.
xn+1 = xn+δ nx [ f (x
n,yn)+wnx ], (7)
yn+1 = yn+δ ny [g(x
n,yn)+wny ]. (8)
The following proposition provides a convergence result
related to the aforementioned two-time scale SA algorithm.
Proposition II.8 ([41], Theorem 2). Consider xn and yn
iterates given in Eqns. (7) and (8), respectively. Then, given the
iterates in Eqns. (7) and (8) are bounded, {(xt ,yt)} converges
to (ψ(y∗),y∗) almost surely under the following conditions.
1) The maps f :Rmx+my →Rmx and g :Rmx+my →Rmy are
Lipschitz.
2) Iterates xn and yn are bounded.
3) Let ψ : y → x. For all y ∈ Rmy , the ODE x˙ = f (x,y)
has an asymptotically stable critical point ψ(y) such that
function ψ is Lipschitz.
4) The ODE y˙ = g(ψ(y),y) has a global asymptotically
stable critical point.
5) Let ξ n be an increasing σ -field defined by ξ n :=
σ(xn, . . . ,x0,yn, . . . ,y0,wn−1x , . . . ,w0x ,wn−1y , . . . ,w0y). Fur-
ther let κx and κy be two positive constants. Then wnx and
wny are two noise sequences that satisfy, E[wnx |ξ n] = 0,
E[wny |ξ n] = 0, E[‖ wnx ‖2 |ξ n] ≤ κx(1+ ‖ xn ‖ + ‖ yn ‖),
and E[‖ wny ‖2 |ξ n]≤ κy(1+ ‖ xn ‖+ ‖ yn ‖).
6) δ nx and δ ny satisfy conditions in Assumption II.6. Addi-
tionally, lim
n→∞sup
δ ny
δ nx
= 0.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION: DIFT-APT GAME
In this section, we model the interactions between a DIFT-
based defender (D) and an APT adversary (A) in a computer
system as a two-player stochastic game (DIFT-APT game).
IFG, G = (VG ,EG), is a representation of the computer system,
where the set of nodes, VG = {u1, . . . ,uN} depicts the N distinct
components of the computer and the set of edges EG ⊂VG×VG
represents the feasibility of transferring information flows be-
tween the components. Specifically, an edge ei j ∈ EG indicates
that an information flow can be transferred from a component
ui to another component u j, where i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,N} and i 6= j.
Let E ⊂ VG be the set of entry points used by A to infiltrate
the computer system. Consider an APT attack that consists of
M attack stages and let D j ⊂ VG for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,M} be
the set of components that are targeted by the APT in the jth
attack stage. Let D j be the set of destinations of stage j.
DIFT tags/taints all the information flows originating from
the set of entry points as suspicious flows. Then DIFT tracks
the propagation of the tainted flows through the system and
initiates security analysis at specific components of the system
to detect the APT. Performing security analysis incurs memory
and performance overhead to the system and it varies across
the system components. The objective of DIFT is to optimally
select a set of system components for performing security
analysis while minimizing the memory and performance over-
head. On the other hand, the objective of APT is to evade
detection by DIFT and successfully complete the attack by
sequentially reaching at least one node from each set D j, for
all j = 1, . . . ,M. The DIFT-APT game unfolds in the infinite
time horizon t ∈ T := {1,2, . . .}.
A. State Space and Action Space
Let S := {s0}∪{VG ×{1, . . . , j}} = {s0,s j1, . . . ,s jN}, for all
j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, represent the finite state space of DIFT-APT
game. The state s0 represents the reconnaissance stage of
the attack where APT chooses an entry point of the system
to launch the attack. Therefore, at time t = 0, DIFT-APT
game starts from s0. A state s
j
i denotes a tagged information
flow at a system component ui ∈ VG corresponding to the
jth attack stage. Also, note that a state s ji , where ui ∈ D j
and j ∈ {1, . . . ,M−1}, is associated with APT achieving the
intermediate goal of stage j. Moreover, a state sMi , where
ui ∈DM , represents APT achieving the final goal of the attack.
Let N (s) be the set of out-neighboring states of state
s ∈ S. Let Ak = ∪s∈SAk(s) be the action space of the player
k ∈ {D,A}, where Ak(s) denotes the set of actions allowed
for player k at a state s. The action sets of the players
at any state s ∈ S is given by AD(s) ∈ N (s) ∪ {0} and
AA(s) ∈ N (s)∪ {∅}. Here, AD(s) ∈ N (s) and AD(s) = 0
denote DIFT deciding to perform security analysis at an
out-neighboring state and deciding not to perform security
analysis, respectively. Also, AA(s) ∈ N (s) represents APT
deciding to transition to an out-neighboring state of s ∈ S and
∅ represents APT quitting the attack. At each step of the game
DIFT and APT simultaneously choose their respective actions.
Specifically, there are four cases. Case (i) s = s0, AA(s) =
{s1i : ui ∈ E} and AD(s) = 0. Here, APT selects an entry
point in the system to initiate the attack. Case (ii) {s = s ji :
ui 6∈ D j, j = 1, . . . ,M}, AA(s) = {s ji′ : (ui,ui′) ∈ EG} ∪ {∅}
and AD(s) ∈ {s ji′ : (ui,ui′) ∈ EG}∪{0}. In other words, APT
chooses to transition to one of the out-neighboring node of ui
in stage j or decides to quit the attack (∅) and DIFT decides to
perform security analysis at an out-neighboring node of ui in
stage j or not. Case (iii) {s = s ji : ui ∈ D j, j = 1, . . . ,M− 1},
AA(s) = s j+1i and AD(s) = 0. That is, APT traverses from
stage j of the attack to stage j + 1 and DIFT does not
perform a security analysis. Case (iv) {s = sMi : si ∈ DM}.
Then, AA(s) = s0 which captures the persistency of the APT
attack and AD(s) = 0.
Note that DIFT does not perform security analysis at the
states corresponding to s0 (case (i)) and destinations (case (iii)
and case (iv)) due to the following reasons. At the entry points
there are not enough traces to perform security analysis as
attack originates at these system components. The destinations
D j, for j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, typically consist of busy processes
and/or confidential files with restricted access. Hence, per-
forming security analysis at states corresponding to entry
points and destinations is not allowed.
B. Policies and Transition Structure
Let st be the state of the game at time t ∈ T . Consider
stationary policies for DIFT and APT, i.e., decisions made at
a state st ∈ S at any time t only depends on st . Let piD and pi A
be the set of stationary policies of DIFT and APT, respectively.
Then stochastic stationary policies of DIFT and APT are
defined by pik ∈ [0,1]|Ak|, where pik ∈ pi k and k ∈ {D,A}.
Moreover, let pik = [pik(s)]s∈S and pik(s) = [pik(s,ak)]ak∈Ak(s),
where pik(s) and pik(s,ak) denote the policy of a player
k ∈ {D,A} at a state s∈ S and probability of player k choosing
an action ak ∈ Ak(s) at the state s. In what follows, we use
ak = d when k=D and ak = a when k= A to denote an action
of DIFT and APT at a state s, respectively.
Assume state transitions are stationary, i.e., state at time
t+1, st+1 depends only on the current state st and the actions
at and dt of both players at the state st , for any t ∈ T . Let
P be the transition structure of the DIFT-APT game. Then
P(piD,piA) represents the state transition matrix of the game
resulting from (piD,piA) ∈ (piD,pi A). Then,
P(piD,piA) =
[
P(s′|s,piD,piA)
]
s,s′∈S , where
P(s′|s,piD,piA)= ∑
d∈AD(s)
∑
a∈AA(s)
P(s′|s,d,a)piD(s,d)piA(s,a). (9)
Here P(s′|s,d,a) denotes the probability of transitioning to
state s′ from state s when DIFT chooses an action d ∈AD(s)
and APT chooses an action a ∈AA(s). Let FN(s ji ) denote the
rate of false negatives generated at a system component ui ∈VG
while analyzing a tagged flow corresponding to stage j of the
attack. Then for a state st , actions dt and at the possible next
state st+1 are as follows,
st+1 =

s ji , w.p 1, when dt = 0 and at = s
j
i
s ji , w.p FN(s
j
i ), when dt = at = s
j
i
s0, w.p 1−FN(s ji ), when dt = at = s ji
s ji , w.p 1, when dt 6= at
s0, w.p 1, when at =∅.
(10)
In the first case of Eqn. (10), the next state of the game is
uniquely defined by the action of APT as DIFT does not
perform security analysis. In the second and thrid cases of
Eqn. (10), DIFT decides correctly to perform security analysis
on the malicious flow. Note that the security analysis of DIFT
can not accurately detect a possible attack due to generation of
false negatives. Hence the next state of the game is determined
by the action of APT (in case two) when a false negative is
generated. And the next state of the game is s0 (in case three)
when APT is detected by DIFT and APT starts a new attack.
Case four of Eqn. (10) represents DIFT performing security
analysis on a benign flow. In such a case, the state of the game
is uniquely defined by the action of the adversary. Finally, in
case five of Eqn. (10), i.e., when APT decides to quit the
attack, the next state of the game is the initial state s0.
False negatives of the DIFT scheme arise from the lim-
itations of the security rules that can be deployed at each
node of the IFG (i.e., processes and objects in the system).
Such limitations are due to variations in the number of rules
and the depth of the security analysis1 (e.g., system call level
trace, CPU instruction level trace) that can be implemented at
each node of the IFG resulting from the resource constraints
including memory, storage and processing power imposed by
the system on each IFG node.
1Detecting an unauthorized use of tagged flow crucially depends on the
path traversed by the information flow [8], [9].
C. Reward Structure
Let rD(s,piD,piA) and rA(s,piD,piA) be the expected reward of
DIFT and APT at a state s ∈ S under policy pair (piD,piA) ∈
(piD,pi A). Then for each k ∈ {D,A},
rk(s,piD,piA) =∑
s′∈S
∑
a∈AA(s)
d∈AD(s)
P(s′|s,d,a)piD(s,d)piA(s,a)rk(s,d,a,s′),
where rk(s,d,a,s′) denotes the reward of player k when state
transition from s to s′ under actions d ∈AD(s) and a ∈AA(s)
of DIFT and APT, respectively. Moreover, rD(s,d,a,s′) and
rA(s,d,a,s′) are defined as follows.
rD(s,d,a,s′)=

α jD +CD(s) if d = a, s′ = s0
β jD if d = 0, s′ ∈ {s ji : ui ∈D j}
σ jD +CD(s) if d 6= 0, a =∅
σ jD if d = 0, a =∅
CD(s) if d 6= a and d 6= 0
0 otherwise
rA(s,d,a,s′)=

α jA if d = a, s′ = s0
β jA if s′ ∈ {s ji : ui ∈D j}
σ jA if a =∅
0 otherwise
The reward structure rD(s,d,a,s′) captures the cost of false
positive generation by assigning a cost CD(s) whenever d 6=
a such that d 6= 0. Note that, rD(s,d,a,s′) consists of four
components (i) reward term α jD > 0 for DIFT detecting the
APT in jth stage, where α1D ≥ . . .≥αMD , (ii) penalty term β jD <
0 for APT reaching a destination of stage j, for j = 1, . . . ,M,
where β 1D ≥ . . .≥ βMD , (iii) reward σ jD > 0 for APT quitting the
attack in jth stage, where σ1D ≥ . . . ≥ σMD , and (iv) a security
cost CD(s) < 0 that captures the memory and storage costs
associated with performing a security checks on a tagged flow
at a state s∈ {s ji : ui 6∈D j∪E}. On the other hand rA(s,d,a,s′)
consists of three components (i) penalty term α jA < 0 if APT
is detected by DIFT in the jth stage, where α1A ≤ . . . ≤ αMA ,
(ii) reward term β jA > 0 for APT reaching a destination of stage
j, for j = 1, . . . ,M, where β 1A ≤ . . . ≤ βMA , and (iii) penalty
term σ jA < 0 for APT quitting the attack in jth stage, where
σ1A ≤ . . . ≤ σMA . Since it is not necessary that rD(s,d,a,s′) =
−rA(s,d,a,s′) for all d ∈AD(s), a∈AA(s) and s,s′ ∈ S, DIFT-
APT game is a nonzero-sum game.
D. Information Structure
Both DIFT and APT are assumed to know the current
state, st of the game, both action sets AD(st) and AA(st), and
payoff structure of the DIFT-APT game. But DIFT is unaware
whether a tagged flow at st is malicious or not and APT does
not know the chances of getting detected at st . This results in
an information asymmetry between the players. Hence DIFT-
APT game is an imperfect information game. Furthermore,
both players are unaware of the transition structure P which
depend on the rate of false negatives generated at the different
states st (Eq. (10)). Consequently, the DIFT-APT game is an
incomplete information game.
E. Solution Concept: ARNE
APTs are stealthy attackers whose interactions with the
system span over a long period of time. Hence, players D
and A must consider the rewards they incur over the long-
term time horizon when they decide on their policies piD
and piA, respectively. Therefore, average reward payoff criteria
is used to evaluate the outcome of DIFT-APT game for a
given policy pair (piD,piA) ∈ (piD,piA). Note that, the DIFT-
APT game originates at s0. Thus the average payoff for player
k ∈ {D,A} with policy pair (piD,piA) is defined as follows.
ρk(s0,piD,piA) = liminf
T→∞
1
T +1
T
∑
t=0
Es0,piD,piA [rk(st ,dt ,at)].
Moreover, a pair of stationary policies (pi∗D,pi∗A) forms an
ARNE of Γ if and only if
ρD(s,pi∗D,pi
∗
A)≥ ρD(s,piD,pi∗A), ρA(s,pi∗D,pi∗A)≥ ρA(s,piD,pi∗A)
for all s ∈ S,pik ∈ pi k.
IV. ANALYZING ARNE OF THE DIFT-APT GAME
In this section we first show the existence of ARNE in
DIFT-APT game. Then we provide necessary and sufficient
conditions required to characterize an ARNE of DIFT-APT
game. Henceforth we assume the following assumption holds
for the IFG associated with the DIFT-APT game.
Assumption IV.1. The IFG is acyclic.
However, note that any IFG with set of cycles can be
converted into an acyclic IFG without loosing any causal
relationships between the components given in the original
IFG. One such dependency preserving conversion is node ver-
sioning given in [42]. Hence this assumption is not restrictive.
Let P(piD,piA) be the Markov chain induced by a policy
pair (piD,piA). The following theorem presents properties of
DIFT-APT game under Assumption IV.1 which will be used
to establish the equilibrium results.
Theorem IV.2. Let the DIFT-APT game satisfies Assump-
tion IV.1. Then, the following properties hold.
1) P(piD,piA) corresponding to any (piD, pA)∈ (piD,piA) con-
sists of a single recurrent class of states (with possibly
some transient states reaching the recurrent class).
2) The recurrent class of P(piD,piA) includes the state s0.
Proof. Consider a partitioning of the state space such that S=
S1 ∪ S2 and S1 ∩ S2 = ∅. Here S1 denotes the set of states
that are reachable2 from state s0 and S2 denotes the set of
states that are not reachable from s0. We prove 1) and 2) by
showing that S1 forms a single recurrent class of P(piD,piA)
and S2 forms the set of transient states.
We first show that in P(piD,piA), state s0 is reachable from
any arbitrary state s∈ S\{s0}. The proof consists of two steps.
First consider a state s = s ji , such that ui /∈ DM with j = M.
In other words, the state s is not a state that is corresponding
to a final goal of the attack. Let s′ be an out neighbor of s.
2In a directed graph a state u is said to be reachable from state v, if there
exists a directed path from v to u.
Then s′ satisfies one of the two cases. i) s′ = s0 and ii) s′ =
s j
′
i′ ∈ S\{s0}. Case i) happens if the APT decides to dropout
from the game or if DIFT successfully detects the APT. Thus
in case i) s0 is reachable from s.
Case ii) happens when DIFT does not detect APT and
the APT chooses to move to an out neighboring state s′. By
recursively applying cases i) and ii) at s′, we get s0 is reachable
when case i) occurs at least once. What is remaining to show
is when only case ii) occurs. In such a case, transitions from
s′ will eventually reach a state corresponding to a final goal
of the attack, i.e., sMi with ui ∈DM , due to the acyclic nature
of the IFG imposed by Assumption IV.1. Note that at sMi with
ui ∈DM the only transition possible is to s0. This proves that
s0 is reachable from any state s ∈ S\ s0.
This along with the definition of S1 implies that S1 forms
a recurrent class of P(piD,piA). Also as s0 is reachable from
any state in S2 and by the definition of S2, S2 is the set of
transient states. This completes the proof.
Corollary IV.3 below presents the existence of an ARNE in
DIFT-APT using Theorem IV.2.
Corollary IV.3. Let the DIFT-APT game satisfies Assump-
tion IV.1. Then, there exits an ARNE for the DIFT-APT game.
Proof. From the condition 1) in Theorem IV.2 the DIFT-
APT game has a single recurrent class of states in P(piD,piA)
corresponding to any policy pair (piD,piA). As a result As-
sumption II.2 holds for DIFT-APT game. Therefore by Propo-
sition II.4 there exits an ARNE in DIFT-APT game.
The corollary below gives a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for characterizing an ARNE of DIFT-APT game. Our
algorithm for computing ARNE is based on this condition.
Corollary IV.4. The following conditions characterizes the
ARNE of DIFT-APT game.
ρk + vk(s)≥ rk(s,ak,pi−k)+ ∑
s′∈S
P(s′|s,ak,pi−k)vk(s′), (11a)
∑
k∈{D,A}
∑
s∈S
∑
ak∈Ak(s)
(
ρk + vk(s)− rk(s,ak,pi−k)
− ∑
s′∈S
P(s′|s,ak,pi−k)vk(s′)
)
pik(s,ak) = 0,
(11b)
∑
ak∈Ak(s)
pik(s,ak) = 1, pik(s,ak)≥ 0, (11c)
where ρk denotes the average reward value of player k
independent of initial state of the game.
Proof. By Proposition II.5, ARNE of an unichain stochastic
game is characterized by conditions (2a)-(2e). The condition
(2a) reduce to (11a) by substituting λ s,akk ≥ 0 from condition
(2d). Below is the argument for condition (2b).
From Theorem IV.2, the Markov chain induced by the
policies (piD,piA), P(piD,piA), contains only a single recurrent
class. As a consequence, from Proposition II.3, ρk(s) = ρk for
all s∈ S and k∈{D,A}. Thus condition (2b) in Proposition II.5
reduces to
ρk−µs,akk = ∑
s′∈S
P(s′|s,ak,pi−k)ρk
= ρk ∑
s′∈S
P(s′|s,ak,pi−k) = ρk
Thus, µs,akk = 0. Since ρk(s) = ρk, condition (2a) in Proposi-
tion II.5 becomes
λ s,akk =ρk+vk(s)−rk(s,ak,pi−k)−∑
s′∈S
P(s′|s,ak,pi−k)vk(s′). (12)
By substituting µs,akk = 0 and λ
s,ak
k from Eqn. (12), condition
(2c) reduces to (11b). Finally, conditions (2d) and (2e) together
reduce to (11c). Thus conditions (11a)-(11c) characterizes an
ARNE in DIFT-APT game.
V. MA-ARNE ALGORITHM OF DIFT-APT GAME
In this section we present a multi-agent reinforcement
learning algorithm that learns ARNE in DIFT-APT game.
A. Multi-Agent Average Reward Nash Equilibrium (MA-
ARNE) Algorithm
Algorithm V.1 presents the pseudocode of our MA-ARNE,
a stochastic approximation-based algorithm with multiple time
scales that computes an ARNE in DIFT-APT game. The
necessary and sufficient condition given in Corollary IV.4 is
used to find an ARNE policy pair (pi?D,pi?A ) in Algorithm V.1.
Algorithm V.1 MA-ARNE Algorithm of DIFT-APT game
1: Input: State space (S), transition structure (P), rewards
(rD and rA), number of iterations (I >> 0)
2: Output: ARNE policies, (pi?D,pi?A )← (pi ID,pi IA)
3: Initialization: n← 0, v0k← 0, ρ0k ← 0, ε0k ← 0, pi0k ← pi k
for k ∈ {D,A} and s← s0.
4: while n6 I do
5: Draw d from pinD(s) and a from pinA (s)
6: Reveal the next state s′ according to P
7: Observe the rewards rD(s,d,a,s′) and rA(s,d,a,s′)
8: for k ∈ {D,A} do
9: vn+1k (s) = v
n
k(s)+δ
n
v [rk(s,d,a,s
′)−ρn+vnk(s′)−vnk(s)]
10: ρn+1k = ρ
n
k +δ
n
ρ
[
nρnk+rk(s,d,a,s
′)
n+1 −ρnk
]
11: εn+1k (s,ak) = ε
n
k (s,ak) + δ
n
ε
[
∑k∈{D,A}(rk(s,d,a,s′) −
ρnk + v
n
k(s
′)− vnk(s))− εnk (s,ak)
]
12: pin+1k (s,ak)=Γ(pi
n
k (s,ak)−δ npi
√
pink (s,ak)
∣∣rk(s,d,a,s′)−
ρnk + v
n
k(s
′)− vnk(s)
∣∣sgn(−εnk (s,ak)))
13: end for
14: Update the state of DIFT-APT game: s← s′
15: n← n+1
16: end while
Using stochastic approximation, iterates in lines 9 and 10
compute the value functions vnk(s), at each state s ∈ S, and
average rewards ρnk of DIFT and APT corresponding to policy
pair (pinD,pinA ), respectively. The iterates, εnk (s,ak) in line 11
and pink (s,ak) in line 12, are chosen such that Algorithm V.1
converges to an ARNE of the DIFT-APT game. We present
below the outline of our approach.
Let Ωs,akk,pi−k and ∆(pi) be defined as
Ωs,akk,pi−k=ρk+vk(s)−rk(s,ak,pi−k)−∑
s′∈S
P(s′|s,ak,pi−k)vk(s′)(13)
∆(pi) = ∑
k∈{D, A}
∑
s∈S
∑
ak∈Ak(s)
Ωs,akk,pi−kpik(s,ak). (14)
Recall that conditions (11a)-(11c) gives a necessary and
sufficient condition for ARNE. Using Eqns. (13) and (14),
conditions (11a) and (11b) can be rewritten as Ωs,akk,pi−k ≥ 0,
for all ak ∈ Ak(s), k ∈ {D,A}, and s ∈ S, and ∆(pi) = 0,
respectively.
In Theorem V.9 we prove that all the policies (piD,piA)
such that Ωs,akk,pi−k < 0 forms an unstable equilibrium point of
the ODE associated with the iterates pink (s,ak). Hence, Algo-
rithm V.1 will not converge to such policies. Consider a policy
pair (piD,piA) such that Ω
s,ak
k,pi−k ≥ 0. Note that, by Eqn. (14), such
a policy pair satisfies ∆(pi)≥ 0. When ∆(pi)> 0, Algorithm V.1
updates the policies of players in a descent direction of ∆(pi)
to achieve ARNE (i.e., ∆(pi) = 0).
Let the gradient of ∆(pi) with respect to policies piD and
piA be ∂∆(pi)∂pi , where pi = (piD,piA). Then for each k ∈ {D,A},
s∈ S, and ak ∈Ak(s), ∂∆(pi)∂pik(s,ak) = ∑
k¯∈{D,A}
Ωs,akk¯,pi−k represents each
component of ∂∆(pi)∂pi . Lemma VII.1 in Appendix shows the
derivation of ∂∆(pi)∂pik(s,ak) . Notice that computation of
∂∆(pi)
∂pik(s,ak)
requires the values of P which is assumed to be unknown in
DIFT-APT game. Therefore the iterate εnk (s,ak) in line 11 es-
timates ∂∆(pi)∂pik(s,ak) using stochastic approximation. Convergence
of −εnk (s,ak) to ∂∆(pi)∂pik(s,ak) is proved in Theorem V.7.
Additionally, in line 12 of Algorithm V.1, the map Γ
projects the policies to probability simplex defined by condi-
tion (11c) in Corollary IV.4. Here, the function sgn(χ) denotes
the continuous version of the standard sign function (e.g.,
sgn(χ)= tanh(cχ) for any constant c> 1). Theorem V.8 shows
that the policy iterates in line 12 update in a valid descent
direction of ∆(pi) and proves the convergence. Theorem V.9
then shows that the converged policies indeed form an ARNE.
Note that the value function iterates in line 9 and the
gradient estimate iterates in line 11 of Algorithm V.1 update in
a same faster time scale δ nv and δ nε , respectively. Policy iterates
in line 12 update in a slower time scale δ npi . Also average
reward payoff iterates in line 10 update in an intermediate
time scale δ nρ . Hence the step-sizes of the proposed algorithm
are chosen such that δ nv = δ nε >> δ nρ >> δ npi . Furthermore, the
step-sizes must also satisfy the conditions in Assumption II.6.
Due to time scale separation, iterations in relatively faster time
scales see iterations in relatively slower times scales as quasi-
static while the latter sees former as nearly equilibrated [43].
B. Convergence Proof of the MA-ARNE Algorithm
First rewrite iterations in line 9 and line 10 as Eqn. (15)
and Eqn. (16) to show the convergence of value and average
reward payoff iterates in Algorithm V.1.
vn+1k (s) = v
n
k(s)+δ
n
v [F(v
n
k)(s)− vnk(s)+wnv ] (15)
ρn+1k = ρ
n
k +δ
n
ρ [G(ρ
n
k )−ρnk +wnρ ] (16)
For brevity we use pi(s,d,a)= piD(s,d)piA(s,a) and pi to denote
(piD,piA). Then, from Eqn. (9),
P(s′|s,pi) = ∑
d∈AD(s)
∑
a∈AA(s)
pi(s,d,a)P(s′|s,d,a).
Two function maps F(vnk)(s) and G(ρ
n
k ) are defined as
F(vnk)(s) = ∑
s′∈S
P(s′|s,pi)[rk(s,d,a,s′)−ρnk + vnk(s′)], (17)
G(ρnk ) = ∑
s′∈S
P(s′|s,pi)
[nρnk + rk(s,d,a,s′)
n+1
]
. (18)
The zero mean noise parameters wnv and w
n
ρ are defined as
wnv = rk(s,d,a,s
′)−ρnk + vnk(s′)−F(vnk)(s), (19)
wnρ =
nρnk + rk(s,d,a,s
′)
n+1
−G(ρnk ). (20)
Let vk = [vk(s)]s∈S. Then the ODE associated with the
iterates given in Eqn. (15) corresponding to all s ∈ S and the
ODE associated with the iterate in Eqn. (16) are as follows.
v˙k = f (vk) (21)
ρ˙k = g(ρk), (22)
where f :R |S|→R |S| is such that f (vk) = F(vk)− vk, where
F(vk) = [F(vk)(s)]s∈S and g : R → R is defined as g(ρk) =
G(ρk)−ρk.
A set of lemmas that are used to prove the convergence of
the iterates in lines 9 and 10 are given below. Lemma V.1
presents a property of the ODEs in Eqns. (21) and (22).
Lemma V.1. Consider the ODEs v˙k = f (vk) and ρ˙k = g(ρk).
Then the functions f (vk) and g(ρk) are Lipschitz.
Proof. First we show f (vk) is Lipschitz. Consider two distinct
value vectors vk and v¯k. Then,
‖ f (vk)− f (v¯k)‖1 =‖ [F(vk)−F(v¯k)]− [vk− v¯k]‖1
≤‖ F(vk)−F(v¯k)‖1+ ‖ vk− v¯k‖1
=∑
s∈S
∣∣∣F(vk)(s)−F(v¯k)(s)∣∣∣+‖ vk− v¯k‖1.(23)
Notice that,
∑
s∈S
∣∣∣F(vk)(s)−F(v¯k)(s)∣∣∣=∑
s∈S
∣∣∣∣∣∑s′∈S P(s′|s,pi)[vk(s′)− v¯k(s′)]
∣∣∣∣∣
≤∑
s∈S
∑
s′∈S
P(s′|s,pi) ∣∣vk(s′)− v¯k(s′)∣∣
≤∑
s∈S
∑
s′∈S
∣∣vk(s′)− v¯k(s′)∣∣
=∑
s∈S
‖ vk− v¯k‖1 = |S| ‖ vk− v¯k‖1.
The inequalities in the above equations are followed
by the triangle inequality and observing the fact that
max{P(s′|s,pi)}= 1. Then from Eqn. (23),
‖ f (vk)− f (v¯k)‖1 ≤ (|S|+1) ‖ vk− v¯k‖1.
Hence f (vk) is Lipschitz. Next we prove g(ρk) is Lipschitz.
Let ρk and ρ¯k be two distinct average payoff values. Then,
|g(ρk)−g(ρ¯k)|=
∣∣∣∣ nn+1 [ρk− ρ¯k]− [ρk− ρ¯k]
∣∣∣∣= |ρk− ρ¯k| .
Therefore g(ρk) is Lipschitz.
Lemma V.4 shows the map F(vnk) = [F(v
n
k)(s)]s∈S is a
pseudo-contraction with respect to some weighted sup-norm.
The definitions of weighted sup-norm and pseudo-contraction
are given below.
Definition V.2 (Weighted sup-norm). Let ||b||ε denote the
weighted sup-norm of a vector b ∈ Rmb with respect to the
vecor ε ∈Rmb . Then,
||b||ε = max
q=1,...,n
|b(q)|
ε(q)
,
where |b(q)| represent the absolute value of the qth entry of
vector u.
Definition V.3 (Pseudo contraction). Let c, c¯ ∈Rmc . Then a
function φ : Rmc → Rmc is said to be a pseudo contraction
with respect to the vector γ ∈Rmc if and only if,
‖ φ(c)−φ(c¯) ‖γ≤ η ‖ c− c¯ ‖γ , where 0≤ η < 1.
Lemma V.4. Consider F(vnk)(s) defined in Eqn. (17). Then the
function map F(vnk) = [F(v
n
k)(s)]s∈S is a pseudo-contraction
with respect to some weighted sup-norm.
Proof. Consider two distinct value functions vnk and v¯
n
k . Then,
‖ F(vnk)(s)−F(v¯nk)(s)‖1 =‖ ∑
s′∈S
P(s′|s,pi)[vnk(s′)− v¯nk(s′)]‖1
=‖ ∑
s′∈S
∑
d∈AD(s)
a∈AA(s)
pi(s,d,a)P(s′|s,d,a)[vnk(s′)− v¯nk(s′)]‖1
≤ ∑
d∈AD(s)
a∈AA(s)
pi(s,d,a)∑
s′∈S
P(s′|s,d,a) ‖ vnk(s′)− v¯nk(s′)‖1 (24)
Eqn. (24) follows from triangle inequality. To find an upper
bound for the term P(s′|s,d,a) in Eqn. (24), we construct
a Stochastic Shortest Path Problem (SSPP) with the same
state space and transition probability structure as in DIFT-APT
game, and a player whose action set is given by AD×AA. Fur-
ther set the rewards corresponding to all the state transition in
SSPP to be −1. Then by Proposition 2.2 in [44], the following
holds condition for all s ∈ S and (d,a) ∈AD(s)×AA(s).
∑
s′∈S
P(s′|s,d,a)ε(s′)≤ ηε(s),
where ε ∈ [0,1]|S| and 0≤ η < 1. Rewrite Eqn. (24) as
|F(vnk)(s)−F(v¯nk)(s)|
≤ ∑
d∈AD(s)
a∈AA(s)
pi(s,d,a)∑
s′∈S
P(s′|s,d,a)ε(s′) |v
n
k(s
′)− v¯nk(s′)|
ε(s′)
≤ ∑
d∈AD(s)
a∈AA(s)
pi(s,d,a)∑
s′∈S
P(s′|s,d,a)ε(s′)max
s′∈S
|vnk(s′)− v¯nk(s′)|
ε(s′)
≤ ∑
d∈AD(s)
a∈AA(s)
pi(s,d,a)∑
s′∈S
P(s′|s,d,a)ε(s′) ‖ vnk− v¯nk‖ε
≤ ∑
d∈AD(s)
a∈AA(s)
pi(s,d,a)ηε(s) ‖ vnk− v¯nk‖ε = ηε(s) ‖ vnk− v¯nk‖ε .
Thus,
|F(vnk)(s)−F(v¯nk)(s)|
ε(s)
≤ η ‖ vnk− v¯nk‖ε
max
s∈S
|F(vnk)(s)−F(v¯nk)(s)|
ε(s)
≤ η ‖ vnk− v¯nk‖ε
‖ F(vnk)−F(v¯nk)‖ε ≤ η ‖ vnk− v¯nk‖ε .
Therefore the result follows.
The next result proves the boundedness of the iterates in
Algorithm V.1.
Lemma V.5. Consider the MA-ARNE algorithm presented in
Algorithm V.1. Then, the iterates vnk(s) and ρ
n
k , for s ∈ S and
k ∈ {D,A}, in Eqn.(15) and Eqn.(16) are bounded.
Proof. Lemma V.4 proved that F(vnk) is a pseudo-contraction
with respect to some weighted sup-norm. By choosing step-
size, δ nv to satisfy Assumption II.6 and observing that the noise
parameter, wnv is zero mean with bounded variance, all the
conditions in Theorem 1 in [45] hold for the DIFT-APT game.
Hence, by Theorem 1 in [45], the iterates vnk(s) in Eqn. (15)
are bounded for all s ∈ S.
From Proposition II.3, a fixed policy pair (piD,piA) and
n >> 0, the average reward payoff values ρnk depend only
on the rewards due to the state transitions that occur within
the recurrent classes of induced Markov chain. Recall that
Theorem IV.2 showed induced Markov chain in P(piD,piA) in
DIFT-APT game contains only a single recurrent class. Let S1
be the set of states in the recurrent class of P(piD,piA). Then
there exists a unique stationary distribution p for P(piD,piA)
restricted to states in S1. Thus for n>> 0 and each k∈ {D,A},
ρnk = ∑
s∈S1
p(s)rk(s,pi), (25)
where p(s) is the probability of being at state s ∈ S1 and
rk(s,pi) = ∑
d∈AD(s)
a∈AA(s)
pi(s,d,a)∑s′∈S P(s′|s,d,a)r(s,d,a,s′) is the
expected reward at the state s∈ S1 for player k ∈ {D,A}. Then
since S1 has finite carnality and the rewards, rk are finite for
DIFT-APT game, ρnk converge to a globally asymptotically
stable critical point given in Eqn. (25) and ρnk iterates are
bounded. This completes the proof.
Theorem V.6 proves the convergence of the iterates vnk(s),
for all s ∈ S, and ρnk .
Theorem V.6. Consider the MA-ARNE algorithm presented
in Algorithm V.1. Then the iterates vnk(s), for all s ∈ S, and ρnk
for k ∈ {D,A} in Eqn. (15) and Eqn. (16) converge.
Proof. By Proposition II.8, convergence of the stochas-
tic approximation-based algorithm by conditions (1)-(6).
Lemma V.1 and Lemma V.5 showed that condition (1) and
condition (2) in Proposition II.8 are satisfied, respectively.
In order to show that condition (3) is satisfied, we first show
F(vnk)(s) is a non-expansive map. Hence, consider two distinct
value functions vnk and v¯
n
k . Then since P(s
′|s,piD,piA)≤ 1, from
Eqn. (24),
‖ F(vnk)(s)−F(v¯nk)(s)‖ ≤‖ vnk(s′)− v¯nk(s′)‖.
Thus F(vnk)(s) is a non-expansive map and hence from Theo-
rem 2.2 in [46] iterates vnk(s), for all s ∈ S and k ∈ {D,A},
converge to an asymptotically stable critical point. Thus
condition (3) is satisfied. Lemma V.5, showed that ρnk , for
k∈{D,A}, converge to a globally asymptotically stable critical
point which implies that condition (4) is satisfied.
From Eqns. (19) and (20), the noise measures have zero
mean. The variance of these noise measures are bounded
by the fineness of the rewards in DIFT-APT game and the
boundedness of the iterates vnk(s) and ρ
n
k . Thus condition (5)
is satisfied. Finally, the choice of step-sizes to satisfy condi-
tion (6). Therefore the results follows by Proposition II.8.
Next theorem proves the convergence of gradient estimates.
Theorem V.7. Consider Ωs,akk,pi−k and ∆(pi) given in Eqns. (13)
and (14), respectively. Then gradient estimation iterate,
εnk (s,ak) in line 11 corresponding to any k ∈ {D,A}, s ∈ S,
and ak ∈Ak(s), converge to − ∂∆(pi)∂pik(s,ak) =− ∑
k¯∈{A,D}
Ωs,akk¯,pi−k .
Proof. Rewrite gradient estimation in line 11 as follows.
εn+1k (s,ak) = ε
n
k (s,ak)+δ
n
ε
[−∑
k¯∈{D,A}
Ωs,akk¯,pi−k− ε
n
k (s,ak)+w
n
ε
]
,
(26)
where wnε= ∑
k∈{D,A}
Ω¯sk+ ∑
k¯∈{D,A}
Ωs,akk¯,pi−k , and Ω¯
s
k = rk(s,d,a,s
′)−
ρnk +v
n
k(s
′)−vnk(s). Note that E(wnε) = 0. Then ODE associated
with Eqn. (26) is given by,
ε˙k(s,ak) =− ∑
k¯∈{D,A}
Ωs,akk¯,pi−k − εk(s,ak).
We use Proposition II.7 to prove the convergence of gradient
estimation iterates, εnk (s,ak). Step-size δ
n
ε is chosen such
that condition 1) in Proposition II.7 is satisfied. Validity of
condition 2) can be shown as follows.
E
 lim
n→∞
sup
n¯>n
∣∣∣∣∣ n¯∑l=nδ lεwlε
∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤ 4 lim
n→∞
∞
∑
l=n
(δ lε)
2E(|wlε |2) = 0.
(27)
Inequality in Eqn. (27) follows by Doob inequality [47].
Equality in Eqn. (27) follows by choosing δ nε to satisfy
Assumption II.6 and observing E(|wlε |2)<∞ as rk, vnk , and ρnk
are bounded in DIFT-APT game. Comparing Eqn. (26) with
Eqn. (5), κ = 0 in Eqn. (26). Therefore, from Proposition II.7,
as n→ ∞, εnk (s,ak)→− ∑
k¯∈{A,D}
Ωs,akk¯,pi−k =−
∂∆(pi)
∂pik(s,ak)
.
Theorem V.8 proves that policy iterates are updated in a
correct decent direction and the policies converge.
Theorem V.8. Recall Ωs,akk,pi−k and ∆(pi) given in Eqns. (13)
and (14), respectively. Then following statements are true for
policy iterate, pink (s,ak) in line 12 corresponding to any k ∈
{D,A}, s ∈ S, and ak ∈Ak(s).
1) Iterate pink (s,ak) is updated in a valid descent direction
of ∆(pi) when Ωs,akk,pi−k ≥ 0 and ∆(pi)> 0.
2) Iterate pink (s,ak) converges.
Proof. First we show statement 1) holds. Rewrite policy
iteration in line 12 as follows.
pin+1k (s,ak)=Γ(pi
n
k (s,ak)−δ npi
(√
pink (s,ak)
∣∣Ωs,akk,pi−k ∣∣
sgn
(
∂∆(pin)
∂pink (s,ak)
)
+wnpi
)
),
(28)
where wnpi =
√
pink (s,ak)
[∣∣Ω¯sk∣∣− ∣∣Ωs,akk,pi−k ∣∣]sgn( ∂∆(pin)∂pink (s,ak)), and
Ω¯sk = rk(s,d,a,s
′)−ρk+vk(s′)−vnk(s). Note that, policy iterate
updates in the slowest time scale when compared to the
other iterates. Thus, Eqn. (28) uses the converged values of
value functions (vk), average reward values (ρk), and gradient
estimates ( ∂∆(pi
n)
∂pink (s,ak)
) with respect to policy pin = (pinD,pinA ).
Consider a policy pin+1k whose entries are same as pi
n
k except
the entry pin+1k (s,ak) which is chosen as in Eqn. (28), for small
0 < δ npi << 1. Let p¯i = (pin+1k ,pi
n
−k) and pˆi = (pi
n
k ,pi
n
−k). Also
note that E(wnpi) = 0. Thus ignoring the term wnpi and using
Taylor series expansion yields,
∆(p¯i) =∆(pˆi)+δ npi
(
−
√
pink (s,ak)
∣∣Ωs,akk,pi−k ∣∣
sgn
(
∂∆(pˆi)
∂pink (s,ak)
)
∂∆(pˆi)
∂pink (s,ak)
)
+o(δ npi )
=∆(pˆi)+δ npi
(
−
√
pink (s,ak)
∣∣Ωs,akk,pi−k ∣∣∣∣∣ ∂∆(pˆi)∂pink (s,ak)
∣∣∣) ,
where o(δ npi ) represents the higher order terms correspond-
ing to δ npi . We ignore o(δ npi ) in the second equality above
since the choice of δ npi is small. Notice that the term
δ npi
(
−√pink (s,ak)∣∣Ωs,akk,pi−k ∣∣∣∣∣ ∂∆(pˆi)∂pink (s,ak) ∣∣∣) is negative. Since ∆(pi)>
0 for any pi ∈ pi , we get ∆(p¯i) < ∆(pˆi). This proves policies
are updated in a valid descent direction.
The second statement follows from the similar arguments
as in the proof of Theorem V.7 by choosing δ npi to satisfy
Assumption II.6 and observing E(|wnpi |2)<∞. This completes
the proof.
Next theorem proves that at the convergence of pink (s,ak),
converged policies form an ARNE in DIFT-APT game.
Theorem V.9. Consider the MA-ARNE algorithm presented in
Algorithm V.1. A converged policy (pi?D,pi?A ) corresponding to
policy iterates in line 12 forms an ARNE in DIFT-APT game.
Proof. The ODE associated with Eqn. (28) can be written as,
p˙ik(s,ak)=Γ¯(−δ npi
(√
pik(s,ak)
∣∣Ωs,akk,pi−k ∣∣sgn
(
∂∆(pi)
∂pik(s,ak)
))
),
(29)
where Γ¯ is the continuous version of the projection op-
erator Γ which is defined analogous to the continuous
projection operator in Eqn. (6). Note that the equilibrium
points of Eqn. (29) consist of set of policies that satisfy
(√
pik(s,ak)
∣∣Ωs,akk,pi−k ∣∣sgn( ∂∆(pi)∂pik(s,ak)))= 0. Assuming3 sgn(·) 6=
0, at the equilibrium, three cases are possible: Case i)
pik(s,ak) = 0 and Ω
s,ak
k,pi−k < 0. Case ii) pik(s,ak) = 0 and
Ωs,akk,pi−k ≥ 0. Case iii) 0 < pik(s,ak)≤ 1 and Ω
s,ak
k,pi−k = 0.
In case i), note that ∂∆(pi)∂pik(s,ak) < 0. Consider a deviation from
the policy pik(s,ak) = 0. By Eqn. (28), updates of pik(s,ak)
will not converge back to zero as it further deviates. There-
fore, case i) forms a set of unstable equilibrium points and
Algorithm V.1 will not converge to such equilibrium points.
In case ii), ∂∆(pi)∂pik(s,ak) > 0. Consider a deviation from the
policy pik(s,ak) = 0. By Eqn. (28), updates of pik(s,ak) will
converge back to zero as the deviation of pik(s,ak) decreases.
Hence, case ii) forms a set of stable equilibrium points and
these points satisfy ∆(pi) = 0 and Ωs,akk,pi−k ≥ 0. This implies
that conditions (11a) and (11b) in Corollary IV.4 are satisfied.
Finally, the projection operator Γ in policy iterates satisfy
condition (11c) in Corollary IV.4. Thus, case ii) corresponds to
an ARNE of DIFT-APT game. Finally, case iii) also satisfies
∆(pi) = 0 and Ωs,akk,pi−k ≥ 0. Using the same arguments as above,
case iii) corresponds to an ARNE. Therefore, Algorithm V.1
converges to an ARNE in DIFT-APT game.
VI. SIMULATIONS
In this section we test Algorithm V.1 on a real-world attack
dataset corresponding to a ransomware attack. We first provide
a brief explanation on the dataset and the extraction of the IFG
from the dataset. Then we explain the choice of parameters
used in our simulations and present the simulation results.
The dataset consists of system logs with both benign and
malicious information flows recorded in a Linux computer
threatened by a ransomware attack. The goal of the ran-
somware attack is to open and read all the files in the
./home directory of the victim computer and delete all of
these files after writing them into an encrypted file named
ransomware.encrypted. System logs were recorded by RAIN
system [13] and the targets of the ransomware attack (des-
tinations) were annotated in the system logs. Two network
sockets that indicate series of communications with external
IP addresses in the recorded system logs were identified
as the entry points of the attack. The attack consists of
three stages, where stage 1 correspond to privilege escalation,
stage 2 relate to lateral movement of the attack, and stage 3
represent achieving the goal of encrypting and deleting ./home
directory. Immediate conversion of the system logs resulted in
an information flow graph, G¯, with 173 nodes and 2426 edges.
The attack related subgraph was extracted from G¯ using the
following graph pruning steps.
1) For each pair of nodes in G¯ (e.g., process and file,
process and process), collapse any existing multiple edges
between two nodes to a single directed edge representing
the direction of the collapsed edges.
2) Extract all the nodes in G¯ that have at least one infor-
mation flow path from an entry point of the attack to a
destination of stage one of the attack.
3This can be achieved by repeating an action in Algorithm V.1 when
sgn(·) = 0. A similar approach has been proposed in the algorithm that
computes an NE of discounted stochastic games in [29].
3) Extract all the nodes in G¯ that have at least one in-
formation flow path from a destination of stage j to a
destination of a stage j′, for all j, j′ ∈ {1, . . . ,M} such
that j 6= j′.
4) From G¯, extract the subgraph corresponding to the entry
points, destinations, and the set of nodes extracted in
steps 2) and 3).
5) Combine all the file-related nodes in the extracted sub-
graph corresponding to a directory into a single node
(e.g., ./home, ./user) in the victim’s computer.
6) If the resulting subgraph contains any cycles use node
versioning techniques [42] to remove cycles while pre-
serving the information flow dependencies in the graph.
The resulting graph is called as the pruned IFG. Steps 2) and
3) are efficiently done by solving a network flow problem with
specified source-sink pairs. The pruned IFG corresponding to
the ransomware attack contains 18 nodes, and 29 edges is
shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: IFG of ransomware attack. Nodes of the graph are
color coded to illustrate their respective types (network socket,
file, and process). Two network sockets are identified as the en-
try points of the ransomware attack. Destinations of the attack
(/usr/bin/sudo,/bin/bash,/home) are labeled in the graph.
Simulations use the following cost, reward, and penalty
parameters.
• Cost parameters: for all s ji ∈ S such that ui /∈D j, CD(s ji )=
−1 for j = 1, CD(s ji ) = −2 for j = 2, and CD(s ji ) = −3
for j = 3. For all other states, s ∈ S, CD(s) = 0.
• Rewards: α1D = 40, α2D = 80, α3D = 120, β 1A = 20, β 2A = 40,
β 3A = 60, σ1D = 30, σ2D = 50, and σ3D = 70.
• Penalties: α1A = −20, α2A = −40, α3A = −60, β 1D = −30,
β 2D = −60, β 3D = −90, σ1A = −30, σ2A = −50, and σ3A =
−70.
Learning rates used in the simulations are
δ nv = δ
n
ε =
{
0.5, if n < 7000
1.6
κ(s,n) , otherwise
δ nρ =
{
1, if n < 7000
1
1+τ(n) log(τ(n)) , otherwise
δ npi =
{
1, if n < 7000
1
τ(n) , otherwise.
Note that the learning rates remain constant until iteration
7000 and then start decaying. We observed that setting learn-
ing rates in this fashion helps the finite time convergence of
the algorithm. Here, the term κ(s,n) in δ nv and δ nε denotes
the total number of times a state s ∈ S is visited from 7000th
iteration onwards in Algorithm V.1. Hence, in our simulations,
the learning rates δ nv of vnk(s) iterates and δ
n
ε of the εn+1k (s,ak)
iterates depend on the iteration n and the state visited at
iteration n. The term τ(n) = n−6999.
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Figure 2: Plots of total objective function φT (pin,ρn,vn), DIFT’s
objective function φD(pin,ρnD,v
n
D), and APT’s objective function
φA(pin,ρnA,v
n
A) evaluated at iterations n= 1,500,1000, . . . ,2.5×106 of
Algorithm V.1 for ransomware attack. Values of objective functions
at the nth iteration depend on the policies pin, average rewards
ρn, and value functions vn of DIFT and APT at the nth iteration.
φD(pin,ρnD,v
n
D) and φA(pi
n,ρnA,v
n
A) are defined in Eqn. (30) and
φT (pin,ρn,vn) = φD(pin,ρnD,v
n
D)+φA(pi
n,ρnA,v
n
A).
Conditions (11a) and (11b) in Corollary IV.4 are used
to validate the convergence of Algorithm V.1 to an ARNE
of the DIFT-APT game. Let φT (pi,ρ,v) = φD(pi,ρD,vD) +
φA(pi,ρA,vA), where pi = (piD,piA), ρ = (ρD,ρA), v = (vD,vA).
Here, φk(pi,ρk,vk), for k ∈ {D,A}, is given by
φk(pi,ρk,vk) =∑
s∈S
∑
ak∈Ak(s)
(
ρk + vk(s)− rk(s,ak,pi−k)
− ∑
s′∈S
P(s′|s,ak,pi−k)vk(s′)
)
pik(s,ak) = 0
(30)
We refer to φT (pi,ρ,v), φD(pi,ρD,vD), and φA(pi,ρA,vA) as
the total objective function, DIFT’s objective function, and
APT’s objective function, respectively. Then conditions (11a)
and (11b) in Corollary IV.4 together imply that a policy pair
forms an ARNE if and only if φD(pi,ρD,vD) = φA(pi,ρA,vA) =
0. Consequently, at ARNE φT (pi,ρ,v) = 0. Figure 2 plots the
φT , φD, and φA values corresponding to the policies given by
Algorithm V.1 at the iterations n = 1,500,1000, . . . ,2.5×106.
The plots show that φD and φA converge very close to 0 as n
increases.
Figure 3 plots the average reward values of DIFT and APT
in Algorithm V.1 at n = 1,500,1000, . . . ,2.5× 106. Figure 3
shows that ρnD and ρnA converge as the iteration count n
increases.
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Figure 3: Plots of the average rewards of DIFT (ρnD) and APT
(ρnA) at a iteration n ∈ {1,500,1000, . . .2.5×106} of Algorithm V.1.
Average rewards at the nth iteration depend on the policies (pin) of
DIFT and APT.
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Figure 4: Comparison of the average rewards of DIFT and APT
corresponding to the converged policies in Algorithm V.1 (ARNE
policy) against the average rewards of the players corresponding
to two other policies of DIFT: uniform policy and cut policy.
Uniform policy: DIFT chooses an action at every state under a
uniform distribution. Cut policy: DIFT performs security analysis at a
destination related state, s ji : ui ∈D j, with probability one whenever
the state of the game is an in-neighbor of that destination related
state.
Figure 4 compares the average rewards of the players
corresponding to the converged policies in Algorithm V.1
(ARNE policy) against the average reward values of the play-
ers corresponding to two other policies of DIFT, i) uniform
policy and ii) cut policy. Note that, in i) DIFT chooses an
action at every state under a uniform distribution. Where as
in ii) DIFT performs security analysis at a destination related
state, s ji : ui ∈D j, with probability one whenever the state of
the game is an in-neighbor4 of that destination related state.
APT’s policy in both uniform policy and cut policy cases are
maintained to be as same as in the case of ARNE policy case.
The results show that DIFT achieves a higher average reward
under ARNE policy when compared to the uniform and cut
policies. Further, results also suggest that APT gets a lower
reward under the DIFT’s ARNE policy when compared to the
uniform and cut policies.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we studied the problem of resource efficient
and effective detection of Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs)
using Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT) detection
mechanism. We modeled the strategic interactions between
DIFT and APT in a computer system as a nonzero-sum,
average reward stochastic game. Our game model captures
the security costs, false-positives, and false-negatives asso-
ciated with DIFT to enable resource efficient and effective
defense policies. Our model also incorporates the information
asymmetry between DIFT and APT that arises from DIFT’s
inability to distinguish malicious flows from benign flows and
APT’s inability to know the locations where DIFT performs
a security analysis. Additionally, the game has incomplete
information as the transition probabilities (false-positive and
false-negative rates) are unknown. We proposed MA-ARNE,
a multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithm to learn an
Average Reward Nash Equilibrium (ARNE) of the DIFT-
APT game. The proposed algorithm is a multiple-time scale
stochastic approximation algorithm. We prove the convergence
of MA-ARNE algorithm to an ARNE of the DIFT-APT game.
We evaluated our game model and algorithm on a real-world
ransomware attack dataset collected using RAIN framework.
Our simulation results showed convergence of the proposed
algorithm on the ransomware attack dataset. Further the results
showed and validated the effectiveness of the proposed game
theoretic framework for devising optimal defense policies to
detect APTs. As future work we plan to investigate and model
APT attacks by multiple attackers with different capabilities.
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APPENDIX
Lemma VII.1. Consider Ωs,akk,pi−k and ∆(pi) given in Eqns. (13)
and (14), respectively. Then, ∂∆(pi)∂pik(s,ak) = ∑
k¯∈{D,A}
Ωs,akk¯,pi−k .
Proof. Recall k ∈ {D,A} and −k = {D,A}\ k.
∆(pi)=∑
s∈S
[
∑
ak∈Ak(s)
Ωs,akk,pi−kpik(s,ak)+ ∑
a−k∈A−k(s)
Ωs,a−k−k,pikpi−k(s,a−k)
]
.
Taking derivative with respect to pik(s,ak) in Eqn. (14) gives,
∂∆(pi)
∂pik(s,ak)
=Ωs,akk,pi−k + ∑
a−k∈A−k(s)
∂Ωs,a−k−k,pik
∂pik(s,ak)
pi−k(s,a−k)
From Eqn. (13),
∂Ωs,a−k−k,pik
∂pik(s,ak)
= ρ−k+v−k(s)−r−k(s,ak,a−k)−∑
s′∈S
P(s′|s,ak,a−k)v−k(s′)
Note that,
∑
a−k∈A−k(s)
∂Ω
s,a−k
−k,pik
∂pik(s,ak)
pi−k(s,a−k) = ∑
a−k∈A−k(s)
[
ρk + vk(s)−
rk(s,ak,a−k)− ∑
s′∈S
P(s′|s,ak,a−k)vk(s′)
]
pi−k(s,a−k) =Ω
s,ak
−k,pi−k
Therefore, ∂∆(pi)∂pik(s,ak) = ∑
k¯∈{D,A}
Ωs,akk¯,pi−k . This proves the results.
